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Abstract 
 
Following the 9/11 terrorists attacks in New York a strong economical effort was 
made to improve and adapt aviation security, both in infrastructures as in airplanes. 
National and international guidelines were promptly developed with the objective of 
creating a security management system able to supervise the identification of risks 
and the definition and optimisation of control measures. 
Risk assessment techniques are thus crucial in the above process, since an incorrect 
risk identification and quantification can strongly affect both the security level as the 
investments needed to reach it. 
The paper proposes a set of methodologies to qualitatively and quantitatively assess 
the risk in the security of civil aviation and the risk assessment process based on the 
threats, criticality and vulnerabilities concepts, highlighting their correlation in 
determining the level of risk. 
RAMS techniques are applied to the airport security system in order to analyse the 
protection equipment for critical facilities located in air-side, allowing also the 
estimation of the importance of the security improving measures vs. their 
effectiveness. 
 
Keywords: Civil Aviation Security, Airport Security, Risk Assessment, RAMS, 
Terrorist threats 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The terrorist attack of September 11th 2001, observed from a socio-economic, 
cultural and political point of view, had a tremendous negative impact on air transport 
never seen before in aviation, unparalleled in history  [1,2,3]. 
Proper measures have soon been taken following the considerations emerged after the 
attacks and most of they are listed in the seventh edition of Annex 17 of the Chicago 
Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [4,5]. Annex 17 
is the key document concerning aviation security and is the primary Annex for 
security-related Standards and Recommended Practices. 
ICAO realised immediately the urgency and the need for restoring the integrity of the 
aviation system and met representatives from 32 nations to discuss new security 
measures. The ICAO has then implemented 66 security standards and 16 
Recommended Practices (SRPs) and has recommended the Universal Security Audit 
Programme (USAP). USAP programme promotes global aviation security through 
the auditing of Contracting States on a regular basis to determine the status of 
implementation of ICAO Annex 17 security Standards. 
Since 9/11, new measures have been taken in order to protect the aircrafts from 
hijacking and sabotage threats and new preventive methodologies have been 
developed to prevent actions which could threaten the aircraft security. 
Other methods and innovative procedures are being developed to improve the airport 
security system and to protect it from new threats, such as the Laser Beams which 
could blind the pilots, the use of Hand Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) 
and explosives which could shoot down the aircraft during the landing or take-off 
procedures. 
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The heads of the aviation industry, such as ACI, IATA, IACA, Airbus and Boeing 
have formed the Global Aviation Security Audit Group (GASAG). They strongly 
affirm that the security of the aviation (AVSEC) is not only a responsibility of the 
civil aviation industry, but also is a security problem of the nations. They have also 
underlined the importance of government bodies and of the intelligence in the control 
of the new emerging threats. 
New countermeasures was suggested, included hundred per cent baggage screening, 
explosives detection, biometric identification of passengers and, maybe, remote 
check-in, risk based threat perception analysis and identification of non-risk 
passengers instead of the rarer risk-passenger, as well as in-flight measures like using 
Sky Marshals, strengthening cockpit doors and cabin monitoring from within the 
cockpit [6-11].  
Thus far, carrying arms has been banned, but the possibility of arming, or at least 
training the crew, in unarmed combat is being seriously considered. Research is also 
on going to improve the efficacy of some of these countermeasures. 
After 9/11 greater attention has been paid to what is established in the Annex 17 in 
the field of the security programs. Particularly, the concepts of threat assessment and 
risk management have been underlined. Both concepts lead to a basic methodology 
able to face effectively the threats addressed to the civil aviation system. 
In the restricted Doc ICAO 8973 [12],  the methodologies of threat assessment and 
risk management are outlined. These methodologies have both an analytical and 
semi-quantitative approach based on numerical scores. However, other 
methodologies can be applied in aviation security and they will be delineated later in 
the present paper.  
 
2. Risk management and risk assessment for airport security 
 
The current security measures in world airports cannot assure total protection against 
every typology of threats, but an effective risk management approach can prepare 
better against acts of terrorism [13,14]. The security risk management is an analytical 
and systematic process which allows the evaluation of the probability of a threat to 
result in a negative action towards an infrastructure, people or critical functions of the 
airport system. Risk management principles acknowledge that while risk generally 
cannot be eliminated, enhancing protection from known or potential threats can 
reduce it.  
The risk management allows the detection of actions which could reduce the risk and 
mitigate the consequences of an attack. The risk management allows to implement 
and to maintain efficient over time all countermeasures, gradually reducing the risk, 
in view of a constant improvement, within acceptable values. 
A good risk management approach includes risk assessment composed by three 
primary elements: a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a criticality 
assessment. 
A threat assessment identifies and evaluates threats based on various factors, 
including capability and intentions as well as the potential lethality of an attack. 
A vulnerability assessment is a process that identifies weaknesses that may be 
exploited by terrorists and suggests options to eliminate or mitigate those weaknesses. 
A criticality assessment is a process designed to systematically identify and evaluate 
an organization’s assets based on their values, the importance of its mission or 
function, the group of people at risk, or the significance of a structure. 
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After the evaluation of the effectiveness of the security controls, the risk assessment 
allows the evaluation of the potential effects resulting from threats, with reference to 
each vulnerable area. The risk assessment, therefore, is performed in order to evaluate 
the risk associated to each critical element of the airport and the loss related to the 
success of threats. In most cases, the risk assessment procedure attempts to strike an 
economic balance between the impact of risks and the cost of security solutions 
intended to manage them. 
The analysis of the Annual Losses Expected (ALE) determined through the risk 
assessment allows to take decision on the amount of economic resources necessary to 
implement the countermeasures. Of course, the cost of countermeasures is only a 
percentage of the ALE’s. Besides, the countermeasures enables the ALE’s  to remain 
within acceptable risk limits. 
 
3. Qualitative and quantitative risk assessment 
 
Risk is a multifaceted issue and must be addressed with methods that are appropriate 
for the decisions to be taken. Historically, risk assessment and risk management 
professionals have focused on accident risks, natural hazard risks, business 
interruption risks, project risks, and financial risks. In these areas, organizations have 
used very systematic processes and tools to understand and prioritize these diverse 
risks, especially those with catastrophic consequences.  
Security related risks are another broad category of risks with potentially catastrophic 
consequences, that after 9/11 has been receiving significant attention [15,16]. While 
security related risks require a different approach than other types of risk, the same 
fundamentals apply. Terrorist attacks and other unlawful acts are a different type of 
threat, but they pose risks in much the same way as other threats. 
In a risk assessment carried on for the security in an airport, the analysis has to 
underline: 
 
 the level of the current risk 
 the possible consequences of attacks 
 the actions to be undertaken if the residual risk is superior to the tolerable 
values 
 
The quantitative risk assessment can be subdivided in the followings steps: 
 
 Threat Assessment 
Detection of the presence of hostile groups in the home territory 
Evaluation of the threat level in the nation  
Evaluation of the threat level near airports  
 
 Vulnerability assessment 
Analysis of the critical points and the functional importance of airport systems 
and infrastructures 
Evaluation, within the system of airport security, of protection systems for 
every critical infrastructure and evaluation of the accessibility and vulnerability 
levels 
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 Criticality Assessment 
Analysis of the potential accidental scenarios consequent to the success of the 
attacks on critical  targets 
Analysis of the costs for the re-establishment of the critical targets and 
evaluation of the missed indirect incomes because of their unavailability; 
Evaluation of the economic losses related to every accidental scenario 
 
The quantification can be done through the followings generalized relations: 
 
Risk = Frequency (F) x Consequence (C)                                        (1) 
 
Frequency (F) = Initiating Event Frequency x Probability All Safeguards Fail        (2) 
 
Risk = [Threat (T) x Vulnerability (V)] x Criticality (C)                           (3) 
 
Where: 
Threat (T) is a measure of the likelihood that a specific type of attack will be initiated 
against a specific target (that is, a scenario).  
Vulnerability (V) is a measure of the likelihood that various safeguards against a 
scenario will fail.  
Criticality (C) is the magnitude of the negative effects if the attack is successful. 
 
Figure 1 there shows the approach for the risk assessment. 
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Figure 1. Risk assessment approach. 
 
One of the key challenges in defining a framework for collecting, organizing, and 
reporting the risk-based information is to determine what level of precision is 
appropriate to support the decisions to be taken.  
In particular, the goal of this study was to propose a framework for risk assessment 
able to support the decision making  in the design and/or optimisation of protection 
levels  for airport security. 
High or even medium precision may not necessarily be achievable, particularly when 
the specific technology for achieving a given antiterrorism capability is not defined or 
is under development [17, 18].  
Several approaches can help accomplishing this objective.  
Matrix based semi-quantitative approach can be based on threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence categories that can be used to capture security related risks information. 
Assigning numerical scores to each category of threat and vulnerability and assigning 
“representative” loss estimates to the consequence categories will provide a scoring 
system that will express the measure of risk in terms of loss exposure, which can be 
directly compared to cost of implementation, thus providing a meaningful benefit/cost 
index for relative ranking. 
A mixed quantitative and semi-quantitative experimental risk based design is e.g. 
currently ongoing in designing the new security systems of Lampedusa and 
Pantelleria airports that are managed directly by the ENAC, the Civil Aviation 
Authority Italy. 
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The qualitative analysis, instead, which is at present conducted in Italy, is based on 
Security Audit, primarily constituted by check lists elaborated by ENAC on the 
indications of the current Italian and European Community legislation. 
The check lists and the inspective procedures are obviously integrated in order to take 
into consideration the international legislation and the technical security 
recommendations (ICAO, ECAC, IATA). 
The Security Audit particularly refers to the following areas: 
 Organization and management of the security systems at national level and 
cooperation with other states 
 Organization and management of the security systems at airport level 
 Control of the access to the airport structures 
 Passengers and hand baggage 
 Hold Baggages  
 Aircraft and flight procedures  
 Cargo and Catering 
 Ability to answer to illegitimate actions and contingency planning 
The results are given as predetermined levels of conformity to the actual security 
standards. The level of vulnerability and the necessary countermeasures to be 
implemented are expressed for each airport area. 
The qualitative risk survey is completed with a report  submitted to the airport 
management companies and to other subjects charged with  the security services who 
must solve the critical points shown and ranked by the analysis within a fixed 
temporal term. 
 
4. Vulnerability and Criticality analysis through modified 
recursive HAZOP and Fault Tree Analysis  
 
A vulnerability assessment is a process that identifies weaknesses in physical 
structures, personnel protection systems, processes, or other areas that may be 
exploited by terrorists and may suggest options to eliminate or mitigate those 
weaknesses. For example, a vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in an 
organization’s security systems or unprotected key infrastructure such as power 
supplies, ATC control towers, and electric facilities. 
A criticality assessment is a process designed to systematically identify and evaluate 
important assets and infrastructure in terms of various factors, such as the mission 
and significance of a target. For example, power generators, radio navigation aids, 
computer networks might be identified as “critical” in terms of their importance to 
airport security, airport economic activity, and airport safety. In addition, facilities 
might be critical at certain times, but not others. For example, a runway when in use 
in heavy air traffic and low visibility conditions may represent an important target. 
Criticality assessments are important because they provide a basis for identifying 
which assets and structures are relatively more important to protect from an attack. 
 
The use of RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintenability and Safety) techniques in 
vulnerability and criticality assessment of an airport is here described applying it to a 
key electrical facility that is a vital part of equipments needed for the airport exercise. 
The equipments are usually located in air side in the physical areas.  
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The physical areas usually present in the airport requiring protection are shown in 
Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. The physical areas usually present in an airport. 
 
The airport perimeter fence is the first physical defence and together with 
technological systems is a fundamental component of the airport security system. 
Inside the airport perimeter there are other critical areas which are protected with 
further combinations of technological systems. 
The technological systems are connected through a centralized architecture that 
manages the monitoring, the events and the states of alarm. An example of simplified 
architecture is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Simplified security protection system architecture. 
 
The case study has been approached through the Recursive Operability Analysis 
[18,19,20] and the Fault Tree Analisys the vulnerability and criticality of a airport 
security protection system of an electric substation for power supply the airfield 
ground lighting and radio navigation aids. These methodologies allow the 
examination of both logical and probabilistic behaviour of the protection system. 
 
An electric substation dedicated to Airfield Ground Lights (AGL) and Radio 
Navigation Aids (RNA) is an important part of the airport electrical systems and, 
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together with other electric components, it is of vital importance for exercise of every 
airport luminous visual aids and of the radio navigation aids. The radio navigation 
aids lead the aircraft to a precision instrumental approach to the runway while the 
luminous visual aids allow the pilots to verify the correctness of approach procedure. 
The unavailability of these systems for lack of power supply makes the airport 
runway unavailable and this, for the airports with only one runway, causes the 
unavailability of the whole airport.  
 
The immediate lack of power supply of radio navigation aids and visual aids can 
cause severe anomalies in the air traffic system and can lead to an accidental 
sequence that could cause air disaster as shown in Hazop analysis depicted in Table 1. 
For these reason the electrical network and the electric substation could constitute the 
target of severe threats by external entity aiming at disabling it through illegal 
actions. 
The simplified sketch of the monitoring and protection systems of electric substation, 
subjected to the vulnerability assessment, is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Simplified scheme of monitoring and protection systems. 
 
The protection system can be considered as composed by: 
 Physical perimeter fence with metallic enclosure 
 System of microwaves sensors 
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 System of perimeter video surveillance  
 Airside millimetre-wave radar 
 Surveillance patrol 
 Physical perimeter of electric substation and protection system with sensitive 
wire 
 System of second internal perimeter video surveillance  
 Protection system of electrical facility internal area through volumetric sensors 
 
The security systems above illustrated are predisposed to identify the presence of 
external non-authorised entities in each part of the airside in order to be able to 
immediately activate suitable countermeasures. 
A hostile entity, that wants to reach the electric substation, has to disable or to avoid 
all the control systems already installed outside and inside the airport. The 
vulnerability of the system is obviously connected with its leaning to become 
unavailable after an attack to some essential components of protection system is 
carried out. 
Through a Recursive Operability Analysis (ROA) is possible, therefore, to examine in 
a better way the functionality of the system and its ability to protect the potential  
targets.  
Furthermore, it is possible to evaluate the differential vulnerability, in comparison to 
the conditions of normal operation, if some components of the system are put out of 
order under attack. 
The ROA allows the Fault Trees to be directly extracted by the analysis tables, for the 
quantification of the identified Top Events. 
 
5.1 Recursive Operability Analysis 
In Table 1, the ROA analysis related to the security protection system in Figure 5 and 
the consequences of the Top Event 1 are shown.  
 
 
Figure 5. Recursive Operability Analysis. 
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This analysis is related to the technological failure of the protection systems and, at 
this stage, does not take into account the voluntary damaging or by-passing carried on 
by airport operators. 
 
5.2 Fault Tree Analisys 
 
The fault tree directly drawn from the ROA tables was solved using ASTRA FTA 
Software [21-24] and is shown in the Figures 6 and 7: 
 
 
Figure 6. Astra Fault Tree—part 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Astra Fault Tree—part 2. 
 
 
 
The reliability parameters used in numerical solution of the fault tree are detailed in 
Table 1: 
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Table 1.   
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Event       Unavaila-   Description                          
 name        bility                                           
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 E1          1.5000E-03  MI Security Operator                 
 E10         1.0000E-03  MI Microwave Sensors Alarm           
 E14         5.0000E-01  MI Perimeter Defence                 
 E1B         1.0000E-02  MI Patrol Operators                  
 E2          1.0000E-03  MI Volumetric Sensors Alarm          
 E4          1.0000E-03  MI Video Surveillance                
 E6          1.0000E-04  MI Sensitive Wire Alarm              
 E9          1.0000E-04  MI Millimeter-wave radar Alarm       
 ERM         1.0000E-05  MI Alarms Telematics Network         
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Some probabilistic parameters are gathered from reliability data-banks [25], the 
missing ones related to the airport security systems was given by the producers of the 
hardware apparatuses.  
 
The cut sets  are listed according to their probabilistic importance in table:  
 
Table 2. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
#        Q           W       Minimal cutsets 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1  7.5000E-06  7.5000E-06  E1         E14        E1B 
2  5.0000E-08  5.0000E-08  E14        E1B        ERM 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Through the simple model here described, it is possible to analyse the two cut sets, 
that for an external hostile entity is very difficult to contemporarily disable both the 
operators of the airport security centre (E1) and the surveillance patrols (E1B) and 
after to climb over the perimeter enclosure (E14).  
It is much more  simple to attack the monitoring  network  (ERM), to climb over the 
monitoring enclosure (E14) and to reach the electric substation deceiving the controls 
of the surveillance patrols (E1B). 
 
The initiating events are illustrated according to their importance in table: 
 
Table 3. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Event       Importance  Description                               
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 E1B         1.0000E+00  MI Patrol Operators                       
 E14         1.0000E+00  MI Perimeter Defence                      
 E1          9.9337E-01  MI Security Operators                     
 ERM         6.6225E-03  MI Alarms Telematics Network              
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
This classification allows, both in phase of design of a new system and in phase of 
analysis or change of an existing system, to understand which system needs to be 
improved. 
With such analysis tools, the relative importance of system components can be 
examined, with the possibility to improve both the general architecture and the 
behaviour of every sub-system. 
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The analysis of the accessibility has shown, through the examination of  cuts sets, that 
a hostile group to have a  successful action needs to:  
 know the facilities airport configuration and the position of the target 
 know the airport surveillance procedures  
 have knowledge of alarms network  
 have equipments to climb over the perimeter enclosure 
 have equipments to disable the alarm network 
 have weapons and tools to shoot the patrol controls  
 have weapons and tools to disable the electric substation 
 
After carrying out the structure vulnerability analysis and the criticality analysis, we 
have also outlined  the profile of the hostile external entity. The criticality analisys 
conducted also by ROA had individualized (see Figure 5) the consequences of an 
attack in terms of economic losses, denial of service, negative image to passengers. 
To complete the risk assessment procedure (see Figure 1) it is necessary to evaluate 
the likelihood that the profiled entity has to decide to attack the target. 
 
By using the threat assessment, the risk assessment procedure is completed then by 
defining the likelihood that one specific hostile entity has, under particular conditions, 
to attack and overcome the protections of a vulnerable target, thus producing 
consequences to which an economic value is associated. 
 
The results can be expressed as expected annual loss (ALE) and they are a good 
indicator  in deciding the investments in the security sector. The threat assessment 
methodology which completes the risk assessment procedure will be shortly 
illustrated soon. 
 
6. Threat Assessment 
 
This last step is fundamental to perform a complete risk assessment related to security 
aspects, but it is still a critical point and characterised by large uncertainties and lack 
of objectivism. 
A threat assessment is used to evaluate the likelihood of terrorist activity against a 
given asset or location. It is a decision support tool that helps to establish and 
prioritize security-program requirements, planning, and resource allocations. A threat 
assessment identifies and evaluates each threat on the basis of various factors, 
including capability, intention, and lethality of an attack. 
The definition of a realistic or real threat set to be taken into account is delegated to 
the intelligence, and to the government bodies (in Italy the Ministry of Defense and 
the Ministry of Interior). Nevertheless, the civil aviation authority contributes to the 
identification of the key elements to be kept into consideration in the analysis.  
In the identification of threats addressed to the civil aviation there are different 
sources of empirical evidence and of available statistic data. They have to be valued 
considering every factor which could result in a terrorist event. 
The ICAO, e.g. has defined a semi-quantitative methodology which considers the 
presence in the nation of terrorist groups, the historical records of aviation attacks, the 
level of internal strike, the entity of the economic problems, the number of the airport 
flights and the number of high risk flights. From elaboration of these indicators which 
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are numerically quantified in a matrix you can have numerical scores which can be 
easily connected with the likelihood of an attack.  
Similarly, the probability that a group with specific characteristics, ability, 
information and equipments is motivated to start a predetermined terrorist action can 
be valued, as in the case of the disabling of an electric substation underlined before. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
A set of scenario attacks towards a specific target can be investigated trough  
examination of its vulnerability and its criticality. 
Every potential scenario can be studied in order to have an estimation of the current 
risk level, the evaluation of  possible economic losses on a annual base, and the set of 
the countermeasures to adopt in order to reduce the risk. 
The quantitative analysis carried out with RAMS methodologies has shown the 
possibility  to investigate vulnerabilities and criticality of the airport components. The  
use of the previous analysis results, melted with the result of threat assessment 
complete the risk assessment procedure. The procedure offer as result the likelihood 
that an attack is successful in the selected scenario, so, is possible to have the 
likelihood that the airport have an economic loss and others serious problems. The 
cumulative set of scenarios investigated define at the end of the process the necessary 
indication to select suitable countermeasures also in terms of economical investment. 
The maintenance of countermeasures over time is a task of the risk management and 
it is fundamental to protect the airport infrastructures and to plan changes to airport 
security systems. 
The effectiveness of the quantitative techniques borrowed from the industrial risk 
assessment for airport security purposes has been demonstrated through their 
application to a simple case study, that could be seen as a part of a complete and more 
detailed analysis.  
The optimised design of the airport security system, its ability to innovate and to 
modify itself in consequence of the results of risk assessment is surely the best 
indicator of the ability to answer to the new incumbent threats and to assure an 
acceptable security risk level to the passenger and airport operators. 
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